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Is Korematsu Good Law? 
Jamal Greene 
abstract.  In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court claimed to overrule its infamous Kore-
matsu decision. This Essay argues that this claim is both empty and grotesque. It is empty because 
a decision to overrule a prior case is not meaningful unless it specifies which propositions the Court 
is disavowing. Korematsu stands for many propositions, not all of which are agreed upon, but the 
Hawaii Court underspecifies what it meant to overrule. The Court’s claim of overruling Korematsu 
is grotesque because its emptiness means to conceal its disturbing affinity with that case. 
introduction 
In Trump v. Hawaii,1 a five-four majority of the Supreme Court said that Ko-
rematsu v. United States2 “was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been 
overruled in the court of history, and . . . ‘has no place in law under the Consti-
tution.’”3 In doing so, the Court stated as clearly as it ever has that Korematsu is 
not good law. This Essay argues that this statement is not just empty but also 
grotesque. 
The emptiness of the Court’s “overruling” does not result primarily from the 
fact that it is dicta and therefore not technically binding on lower courts. The 
statement is indeed dicta—as evidenced by the Court’s claim, in virtually the 
same breath, that “Korematsu has nothing to do with this case”4—but in practical 
terms, no lower court would revive a case that a majority of the Supreme Court 
has clearly said was wrongly decided. 
 
1. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
2. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
3. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
4. Id. 
the yale law journal forum January 30, 2019 
630 
Rather, the statement is empty because it is underdetermined. As Part I elab-
orates, when the Court discards a precedent it does not overrule a “case” but 
rather particular propositions stated in that case’s majority opinion. But the 
propositions a case stands for are often varied and contested. A case may stand 
for multiple independent propositions, its particular holdings may have been 
disputed in the moment, and even if that contemporaneous disagreement is 
sorted out, what a case stands for in modern times might differ from what it 
actually held at the time of the decision. 
As Part II develops in greater detail, each of these qualifications on “overrul-
ing” applies in the case of Korematsu. The majority in Hawaii did not specify 
which aspect of the case it was overruling. Anticanonical cases such as Korematsu 
are especially vulnerable to these kinds of underdetermined “overrulings” be-
cause their legacies have escaped far beyond the control of the deciding Court.5 
It is accordingly obscure what, if anything, the “overruling” of Korematsu means. 
The Court’s statement is grotesque because, as Part III notes, it condemns 
racism with one hand but deploys tokenism with the other. The statement ap-
pears in a case in which the majority blessed transparent religious bigotry on the 
part of the sitting President while cloaking itself in righteous indignation over a 
seventy-four-year-old decision whose wrongness is a matter of incompletely 
theorized consensus. The canary in the coal mine for this incomplete theoriza-
tion is Justice Thomas’s presence in the majority. Justice Thomas’s prior favora-
ble statements about Korematsu are difficult to reconcile with the claim that Ko-
rematsu is obviously wrong in all its particulars, and yet he was comfortable 
joining the Hawaii majority. Either Justice Thomas has had a change of heart 
about Korematsu or there is less to this “overruling” than meets the eye. 
i .  the underdeterminacy of overrulings  
Cases stand for multiple propositions. They often do so in a “horizontal” 
sense as well as a “vertical” sense. The horizontal sense refers to the different 
steps that go into discerning the law and applying it to a set of facts. An opinion 
might use a particular mode of interpretation or construction of legal texts, as 
for example when a court uses historical analysis—itself conspicuously amenable 
to multiple usages6—or textualism or structuralism or what-have-you.7 It might 
apply a particular analytic frame, such as proportionality analysis or “tiers of 
 
5. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011). 
6. See Jamal Greene, Interpretation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 887, 888-
95 (2015). 
7. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (describing six modalities of con-
stitutional interpretation). 
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scrutiny.”8 It might adopt a particular standard of review, whether for determin-
ing if a law or executive act should be permitted to stand, such as “strict scrutiny” 
or “rational basis review,”9 or for factual or legal determinations by a lower court, 
such as “clear error” or “abuse of discretion.”10 It might identify particular facts 
as legally dispositive, or else apply a “totality of the circumstances” test that 
makes it more difficult to disaggregate the analytic work different facts are per-
forming.11 It might identify certain aspects of the holding as more “central” than 
others, as the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey12 did with respect to Roe v. Wade.13 Opinions can also reflect an overlap-
ping consensus around language that is understood differently by different 
judges. Sometimes these potential differences are highlighted in concurring 
opinions that specify a reading of the majority opinion that does not itself com-
mand a majority.14 
The vertical sense in which cases can stand for multiple propositions reflects 
the ways in which a case can change in meaning over time, whether unwittingly 
or deliberately. For example, Bolling v. Sharpe15 is often cited as inaugurating “re-
verse incorporation,” whereby the Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal 
government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,16 but this 
proposition is not fairly stated within the text of Bolling. Similarly, the Slaughter-
House Cases are often said to preclude incorporation of the Bill of Rights via the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though 
Justice Miller’s majority opinion suggests that the Clause protects, for example 
(and not exhaustively), the rights of assembly and petition, which are found in 
the First Amendment.17 Or consider Justice Scalia’s opinion in Employment Di-
vision v. Smith, which reimagined the significance of cases such as Wisconsin v. 
 
8. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094 (2015). 
9. See Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 1324 
(2018). 
10. See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47 (2000). 
11. E.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986). 
12. 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992). 
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
14. E.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785-87 (2014) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). 
15. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
16. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 
323, 327 n.15 (2011). 
17. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872); see Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism 
Straight: A Reinterpretation of The Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000). 
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Yoder18 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters19 as addressing “hybrid” constitutional 
rights.20 One searches in vain for even an implicit reference to hybridity in those 
earlier opinions themselves. 
And so overruling almost always requires further specification. If a case is 
simply overruled without the opinion stating which aspects of the case it is dis-
avowing, the overruling can itself remain subject to contestation. The underde-
terminacy of overrulings has implications for the Hawaii Court’s treatment of 
Korematsu. We cannot make sense of whether Korematsu remains good law in 
light of the Hawaii Court’s statement without specifying what the Hawaii ma-
jority took Korematsu to mean. This specification turns out to be elusive. 
i i .  the many meanings of korematsu  
Korematsu is anticanonical. As I have noted in prior work,21 anticanonical 
cases are famous for being wrong. They are repeatedly cited long after being dis-
credited, ostensibly as examples of faulty legal analysis.22 Korematsu’s anticanon-
ical status puts it in the company of other notorious cases such as Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,23 Plessy v. Ferguson,24 and Lochner v. New York.25 These cases are used 
as epithets as much as precedents in the usual sense.26 
Korematsu’s status as anticanonical presents an analytic challenge in under-
standing what the case stands for. If everyone knows a case is wrong, its invoca-
tion becomes a potent weapon for attacking one’s legal adversary. Korematsu has 
been invoked well beyond the detention context to criticize, for example, affirm-
ative action,27 birth control laws,28 drug testing policies,29 and laws restricting 
abortion protests.30 Anticanonical cases are so liberally invoked against oppo-
nents that their use can resemble ad hominem attacks. Overruling Korematsu—
 
18. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
19. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
20. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881, 882 (1990). 
21. See Greene, supra note 5, at 380. 
22. See id. 
23. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
24. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
25. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
26. See Greene, supra note 5, at 441-42, 446, 453-56. 
27. See Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
28. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
29. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
30. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 814-15 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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or any anticanonical case—is like a state disavowing “the Nazis.” It is worth 
pressing on what, in particular, is being disavowed. 
Note as well that, as with the Third Reich, part of why anticanonical cases 
remain potent examples is not just because of their negative moral valence but 
also, and more controversially, because of the ways in which modern practices 
overlap with the practices of discredited historical actors.31 For example, Dred 
Scott is invoked because many conservatives still—like Chief Justice Taney—pro-
mote originalism as a morally neutral methodology32 and because many liberals 
still—again, like Chief Justice Taney—invoke substantive due process in the ab-
sence of textual specification of a right.33 Korematsu shows up so often in the U.S. 
Reports, as it did in Hawaii,34 because pleas for judicial deference to the execu-
tive’s national security determinations remain so familiar. When the Court pur-
ports to overrule Korematsu, it is not overruling this deference, as the majority 
opinion applying near-absolute deference in Hawaii makes pellucid.35 So what, 
exactly, is being overruled? 
Trying to get at that question requires a deeper understanding of the decision 
than has seeped into the popular legal consciousness. Korematsu was a criminal 
case in which Fred Korematsu contested his conviction for refusing to report to 
a relocation camp established for people of Japanese ancestry living on the West 
Coast.36 Korematsu claimed a violation of the Due Process Clause (an early and 
infrequently acknowledged claim of “reverse incorporation”) and the Eighth 
Amendment.37 The evacuation order that authorized Korematsu’s relocation was 
promulgated by Army Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, who was overseeing 
the West Coast during the war.38 In justifying relocation, General DeWitt au-
thored a report that painted a deeply biased portrait of the threat to the United 
States posed by people of Japanese ancestry residing on the West Coast.39 The 
report asserted, for example, that “[t]he very fact that no sabotage has taken 
place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be 
 
31. See Greene, supra note 5, at 462-63. 
32. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). 
33. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, Two Thoughts About Obergefell v. Hodges, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 
913 (2016). 
34. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2447-48 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
35. See id. at 2417-20, 2423 (majority opinion). 
36. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944). 
37. Korematsu v. United States, 140 F.2d 289, 295 (9th Cir. 1943) (Denman, J., concurring). 
38. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 227 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
39. See id. at 235-36 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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taken.”40 The exclusion order also, and pointedly, did not distinguish between 
U.S. citizens and noncitizen Japanese nationals.41 In an opinion by Justice Black, 
the majority held that government racial classifications should receive “the most 
rigid scrutiny” but that the classification in this case passed muster.42 
There are many potential answers for what the Hawaii Court thought was 
wrong with Korematsu as a matter of legal analysis. One possibility is that the 
government may never use race as a criterion for detention. The majority in Ha-
waii described Korematsu, and its wrongness, along superficially related lines: 
“The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and ex-
plicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Pres-
idential authority.”43 This sentiment seems straightforward enough, but the pas-
sage includes a number of qualifiers that dramatically narrow its connection, if 
any, to the actual Korematsu decision. 
First, the Hawaii Court limited the scope of its statement to “U.S. citizens,” 
seeming to imply that a racial classification of noncitizens would not necessarily 
be “objectively unlawful.” The exclusion order at issue in Korematsu famously 
did not distinguish between citizens and noncitizens, and it is not at all clear why 
government racial bias should be disavowed only with respect to the former. 
Second, we can take note of the Hawaii majority’s use of the term “concen-
tration camps.” This pejorative seems awake to the social meaning of Japanese 
internment but at the same time lessens the scope of whatever is being overruled. 
Would a race-based house arrest or curfew—along the lines of what the Court 
blessed the year before Korematsu in Hirabayashi v. United States44—be a live issue 
for the Hawaii majority? Might there be features even of a detention facility, or 
circumstances surrounding a detention decision, that make the “concentration 
camp” label inapt? 
Third, the Hawaii Court was careful to limit its finger wagging to the deten-
tion of U.S. citizens effected “solely and explicitly” on the basis of race. This is a 
very large qualifier indeed. “Explicitly” seems to confine the “overruling” to fa-
cial racial classifications, which are far less common than the use of racial proxies. 
“Solely” appears to contemplate detention for which race is the only criterion, 
rather than one among others. It is difficult to imagine a government policy of 
any kind for which the sole criterion is race, and the Hawaii Court did not exclude 
the possibility that race might be the predominant criterion for a policy that is 
 
40. Id. at 241 n.15 (quoting J.L. DEWITT, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST 
COAST, 1942 (1943)). 
41. See id. at 229 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
42. Id. at 216-18 (majority opinion). 
43. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
44. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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nonetheless lawful. The exclusion order at issue in Korematsu came as close as 
any government decision in modern times to pure race-based detention, and 
even there it was not clear that the case would fit what the Hawaii Court consid-
ered “objectively unlawful.” 
For one thing, the labels “Japanese” and “of Japanese descent” do not de-
scribe a “race” in the usual sense. They do describe a national origin, and they 
do rely on bloodlines, which we might believe morally or constitutionally equiv-
alent to racial distinctions. But the Hawaii Court did not tell us how it under-
stands race as a social category. For another thing, we can put to one side the 
definition of “race” and note that what the Korematsu majority claimed to find 
interesting about the targets of the exclusion order was not their “race” but the 
fact that they or their family members were presumptively loyal to Japan. As Jus-
tice Black wrote, in conclusory fashion: 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility 
to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japa-
nese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared 
an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security 
measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation 
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the 
West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its con-
fidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it must—
determined that they should have the power to do just this.45 
Of course, the Hawaii Court singled out Korematsu, and so it seemed to be-
lieve that the case’s facts qualified as detention “solely” on the basis of race. But 
either of two competing readings of Korematsu could support this belief. Racial 
profiling, and racial discrimination in general, can be condemned as either 
wrong on the facts, wrong independent of the facts, or both. That is, we might 
believe that racial discrimination is wrong because the decisionmaker is mistaken 
(or unacceptably likely to be mistaken) empirically about the relationship be-
tween race and an undesirable behavior or trait. We might worry, for example, 
that a cop who stops black drivers because he thinks they might have incrimi-
nating evidence in their cars is engaged in bad policing because he is ignoring or 
sidelining more reliable indicators of criminality than race. Alternatively, we 
might believe that, regardless of whether race is a reliable indicator of bad be-
havior, engaging in racial discrimination is itself so offensive that we do not per-
mit it notwithstanding its rationality or effectiveness. 
Either of these critiques is available in Korematsu. As noted, the military in 
Korematsu relied on false information, as did the Department of Justice in 
 
45. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. 
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presenting the case to the Court.46 And so when the Hawaii Court associated 
Korematsu with the proposition that forcible relocation to concentration camps 
should never rely “solely” on race, it could be saying that (1) relying on false 
information about racial tendencies meant internment was in fact solely about 
race, or (2) even the use of true information about racial correlations would have 
impermissibly counted as sole reliance on race. These two possibilities have 
vastly different implications for the permissibility of government acts, and Ha-
waii gives us no resources for evaluating which might be “objectively unlawful.” 
Further, it is notable that Hawaii’s statement about Korematsu is limited to 
race. Understanding Korematsu in racial terms not only has the confounding con-
sequence noted above regarding the definition of “race,” but it also suggests that 
the Court does not view the case in terms of national origin, leaving open the 
possibility that national origin may yet form the basis for a detention or exclu-
sion decision. In contrasting Korematsu and the travel ban, the Hawaii Court also 
pointedly implied that decisions based on religion—which are at least as likely—
might be categorically different than those based on race. 
Finally, the Hawaii majority referred to the forcible relocation of U.S. citizens 
to concentration camps solely and explicitly on the basis of race as falling outside 
“Presidential authority.”47 Notably, although the exclusion order at issue in Ko-
rematsu was authorized by an executive order, the decision to take race-based 
actions as to relocation was not the President’s but rather had been delegated to 
the military. Justice Jackson’s Korematsu dissent objected to the intermingling of 
constitutional adjudication with orders taken in the name of purported military 
necessity.48 We can assume, but can’t say for sure, that the Hawaii Court meant 
to include the military’s decision within the scope of “Presidential authority,” 
but it is difficult to read the Court’s statement as applying to Congress. 
Korematsu’s meaning, then, and what exactly made it wrong by the Hawaii 
Court’s lights, is unclear. As noted, there were many potential reasons for con-
cern in Korematsu, ranging from the targeting of U.S. citizens, to relying on 
faulty information, to using race for particularly injurious purposes, to using 
race at all, to delegating the decision to the military in the absence of martial law, 
to delegating it to the President as opposed to passing a statute. It so happens as 
well that Korematsu has been cited positively on numerous occasions, including 
 
46. See Neal Kumar Katyal, The Solicitor General and Confession of Error, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027, 
3032-36 (2013). 
47. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. 
48. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 244-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 246 (“A military commander 
may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and ap-
prove, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a genera-
tive power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image. Nothing better illustrates 
this danger than does the Court’s opinion in this case.”). 
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many times by the Court itself, as an early statement of the proposition that strict 
scrutiny attends racial classifications.49 A Court that overrules “Korematsu” pre-
sumably is not overruling this aspect of the case. And since it is quite unlikely 
that a case whose facts precisely mirror the facts of Korematsu will arise again, it 
would be helpful to know what beyond a decision on the precise facts of the case 
has been disavowed. 
Of course, a Court that distances itself from a prior decision may simply do 
so rhetorically, without necessarily meaning to refer to a particular, technical 
holding. But if that was what the Court meant to do, we might expect it to do so 
in a case whose spirit sits in tension with the earlier decision. 
i i i .  the tokenism of trump v.  hawaii  
Which brings us to the disturbing role Korematsu played in Hawaii. There is 
good reason to believe that the Court’s curious claim about Korematsu was not 
just underdetermined but also intentionally narrow. As such, claiming to over-
rule the decision conceals its affinity with Hawaii while doing nothing to move 
the law. 
The majority “overruled” Korematsu as part of its defense against Justice So-
tomayor’s invocation of the case in her dissent.50 President Trump’s multiple 
concessions that the travel ban was a pretext for anti-Muslim bigotry were re-
markably transparent. During his presidential campaign, candidate Trump 
promised repeatedly, including in a statement on his campaign website, to ban 
the entry of all Muslims into the United States.51 His reason, in his own words, 
was that “Islam hates us” and “Muslims ‘do not respect us at all.’”52 Later in the 
campaign, he began to characterize the policy as a ban on people from countries 
with ties to terrorism, explaining that he was not in fact pulling back from his 
Muslim ban but that “[p]eople were so upset when [he] used the word Mus-
lim.”53 President Trump signed the executive order implementing the first ver-
sion of the travel ban one week after taking office.54 It was titled “Protecting the 
Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” but when President 
Trump read the title at the signing, he looked up and said, “We all know what 
that means.”55 After signing the second version of the executive order, President 
 
49. See Greene, supra note 5, at 456. 
50. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423; id. at 2447-48 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
51. See id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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Trump declared that it represented the fulfillment of a campaign promise.56 He 
later said that the Executive Order had been “tailor[ed]” because of “the lawyers” 
and that it was a “watered down, politically correct version” of the “original 
Travel Ban.”57 
The Hawaii majority did not deny that the travel ban was in fact a pretext for 
discrimination against Muslims. Rather, in the face of the evidence just de-
scribed, it chose to refuse to look beneath the President’s (or we should say, “the 
lawyers[’]”58) facial justification for his executive order. The parallel between 
this deferential posture and the Court’s performance in Korematsu is nearly im-
possible to ignore and makes it especially difficult to discern what about Kore-
matsu the Hawaii majority meant to overrule. 
What’s more, there’s an additional “tell” that the Court didn’t mean to over-
rule very much at all. The majority included Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas has 
in multiple opinions indicated some openness to the view that Korematsu was 
correctly decided. Most recently, in Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher I), which 
considered the school’s limited use of race in its admissions process, Justice 
Thomas favorably cited Korematsu in his solo concurrence, writing as follows: 
The Court first articulated the strict-scrutiny standard in Korematsu v. 
United States. There, we held that “[p]ressing public necessity may some-
times justify the existence of [racial discrimination]; racial antagonism 
never can.” Aside from Grutter, the Court has recognized only two in-
stances in which a “[p]ressing public necessity” may justify racial dis-
crimination by the government. First, in Korematsu, the Court recognized 
that protecting national security may satisfy this exacting standard. In 
that case, the Court upheld an evacuation order directed at “all persons 
of Japanese ancestry” on the grounds that the Nation was at war with 
Japan and that the order had “a definite and close relationship to the pre-
vention of espionage and sabotage.”59 
Justice Thomas had also cited Korematsu favorably in his dissent in the 
Court’s then-most-recent race-based affirmative action case, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
writing that Korematsu’s “lesson” is that “national security constitutes a pressing 
public necessity,’ though the government’s use of race to advance that objective 
must be narrowly tailored.”60 Justice Thomas had earlier, in Missouri v. Jenkins, 
 
56. Id. at 2437. 
57. Id. (alteration in original). 
58. Id. 
59. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422-23 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (footnote 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
60. 539 U.S. 306, 351 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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written that strict scrutiny is “fatal in fact” except for decisions “rendered in the 
midst of wartime,” a proposition for which he cited both Korematsu and Hira-
bayashi.61 
Perhaps most telling is Justice Thomas’s solo dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.62 
In Hamdi, the Court held that the government owed some due process to a U.S. 
citizen who had been picked up in Afghanistan, declared an enemy combatant, 
and placed in a brig in South Carolina.63 Justice Thomas disagreed, writing that 
deference to the decisions of the executive in a time of war “extends to the Pres-
ident’s determination of all the factual predicates necessary to conclude that a 
given action is appropriate.”64 His dissent cited favorably to Hirabayashi.65 
No modern Justice other than Justice Thomas has ever cited either Korematsu 
or Hirabayashi for the correctness of their substantive legal analysis.66 In light of 
this evidence, it is hard to believe Justice Thomas thinks Korematsu was “gravely 
wrong” except at a frustratingly high level of specificity—that is, only when lim-
ited to its precise facts. 
conclusion  
The majority in Trump v. Hawaii said it was overruling “Korematsu” without say-
ing in which of many possible ways it was doing so, all while holding the vote of 
a Justice whose opinions have implied substantial agreement with the decision. 
Everyone knows that something about the case was rotten. But so long as this 
consensus remains incompletely theorized,67 the Court can, without spending 
any capital whatsoever, try to earn some plaudits for overruling Korematsu.68 
Of course, the majority’s disclaimer notwithstanding, there are disturbing 
resonances between Korematsu and Hawaii.69 In both cases, decisions plainly 
 
61. 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
62. 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
63. Id. at 509-11 (majority opinion) 
64. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. 
66. It is common for Korematsu to be cited favorably for its incantation of what has become the 
strict scrutiny standard. See Greene, supra note 5, at 456-57. 
67. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 
(1995). 
68. Even Justice Sotomayor’s dissent called the majority’s purported overruling of Korematsu “an 
important step” and “laudable.” See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2448 (2018) (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting). 
69. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned 
and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 641 (2019). 
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motivated by group-based animus were justified by and received near-absolute 
deference on the basis of specious invocations of national security.70 Korematsu’s 
overruling has been in the works for decades. It was meant for better things.71 
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70. See Eric K. Yamamoto & Rachel Oyama, Masquerading Behind a Facade of National Security, 128 
YALE L.J.F. 688 (2019). 
71. Cf. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment was meant for better things.”). 
